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The German Question of Reunification:
An Historical and Legal Analysis of the
Division of Germany and the 1989
Reform Movement in the German
Democratic Republic
I. Introduction
At midnight on September 10, 1989, when about 60,000 East
German vacationers were in Hungary, the government of Hungary
officially opened its doors to the West.1 Since that time, tens of
thousands of East Germans have fled unmolested through Hungary
to West Germany. This illegal exodus had begun in May 1989 when
Hungary began clipping the barbed wire separating the East bloc
from Austria.2 Hungary, which rejected East Germany's angry pro-
tests, accused its Warsaw Pact ally of triggering the exodus by deny-
ing its citizens democratic rights.3 Hungary was the first East bloc
government to help the citizens of another Communist nation freely
leave their homeland."
In ways once thought to be completely unattainable, the politi-
cal climate of Eastern Europe is changing rapidly and radically.
More than 170,000 East Germans left East Germany in 1989, which
is the largest emigration since the Berlin Wall went up in 1961.1 In
Poland, a government led by Solidarity, the independent trade union
which was banned only a few months prior to September 1989, has
taken power as the first non-Communist government in the East bloc
in forty-one years.6 Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev's reform poli-
cies of glasnost and perestroika began to move the Soviet population
away from the strict orthodoxies of conventional communism and to-
wards a more democratic ideology. 7 With the opening of the Berlin
Wall in November 1989, the German question of reunification has
once again emerged.
This Comment will consider the prospects of a German reunifi-
1. N. Y. Times, Sep. 13, 1989, at 1, col. 5.
2. TIME, Oct. 16, 1989, at 39.
3. Philadelphia Inquirer, Sep. 17, 1989, at 5, col. 4.
4. Philadelphia Inquirer, Sep. 12, 1989, at 1, col. 6.
5. TIME, supra note 2 at 40.
6. Philadelphia Inquirer, supra note 3, at 5, col. 4.
7. U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, Sep. 25, 1989, at 34, col. 1.
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cation in the context of the current tide of events in Eastern Europe
and its legal significance under international law. Section II will give
a brief background of the origins and development of the two
Germanies with an emphasis on the postwar era. Section III will
analyze the political structure of the Federal Republic of Germany
and its constitution, the Basic Law. Section IV will examine the ori-
gins and growth of the German Democratic Republic and the events
leading to and occurring after the construction of the Berlin Wall.
Section V explores the judiciary of the Federal Republic of Germany
and evaluates the decision of the Constitutional Court regarding the
dispute over the Basic Treaty of 1972 between the Federal Republic
of Germany and the German Democratic Republic. Section VI pro-
vides an overview of the major forms of opposition that have plagued
the German Democratic Republic under the Honecker era (1971-
1989). Finally, Sections VII and VIII will examine the recent mass
exodus out of East Germany after Hungary opened its borders to the
West and the future of the German Democratic Republic.
II. Background
In the 1,970 years of its recorded history, Germany has had
only seventy-four years, from 1871 to 1945,8 in which it represented
a politically unified, integrated state system. This period of unifica-
tion can be subdivided into three systematic phases: the first forty-
seven years falling under the period of the Second German Empire
created by Bismarck and lasting from 1871 to 1918; the next fifteen
years constituted the period of the parliamentary democracy known
as the Weimar Republic (1918 to 1933); and finally, the twelve
years of Hitler's Third Reich from 1933 to 1945.1 In 1918, the Wei-
mar Republic was erected in the wake of World War 1.10 After four-
teen years of disorder, the Republic collapsed and was succeeded in
1933 by the National Socialist dictator, Adolf Hitler."
Hitler's regime was tyrannical and oppressive, particularly to
Jews, but it surmounted the world-wide depression that had virtually
crippled the other major industrial countries. Within a few years, the
Third Reich had restored virtually full employment and had
achieved a respected level of prosperity which bolstered Hitler's pop-
ularity in Germany and abroad.'" Hitler intended, however, to use
8. Kindermann, The Case of Germany, 8 Occasional Papers/Reprints in Contemporary
Asian Studies 113, University of Maryland School of Law (1981).
9. Id. at 114.
10. M. DENNIS, GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC 2 (1988).
11. Id. at 3.
12. H. TURNER, THE Two GERMANIES SINCE 1945, at 2 (1987) [hereinafter H. TUR-
NER]. From 1919 until the end of 1923 the Weimar Republic was in a state of chronic crisis.
In June 1919, the victorious Western Powers imposed on Germany the Treaty of Versailles, a
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the productive capacities of Germany not to improve the lot of the
German people, but rather to prepare for a war of ruthless and far-
reaching conquest. 13 Following a series of diplomatic victories which
ultimately resulted in the disregard for the Versailles Peace Settle-
ment, Hitler launched what would become'the Second World War
when he invaded Poland in September 1939 14 During the next five
and a half years, Germany, which was joined by Fascist Italy in
1940 and temporarily allied with the Soviet Union, quickly domi-
nated the European continent by attacking'Poland, Denmark, Nor-
way, the Netherlands, Belgium and France. 5 Hitler also set his
sights on Britain. In the summer of 1941 he invaded the Soviet
Union and by December had declared war on the United States.1
Ultimately, the tide turned on the Third Reich as the Soviets
stopped the German advance and the Western Allies swept away
Mussolini's fascist regime. 7 In the spring of 1945, the European
conflict finally came to an end as Hitler committed suicide and Ger-
many was taken over by the Allied Powers;' 8 The German military
leaders agreed to an unconditional surrender and in May 1945, So-
viet, American, British, Canadian, and French troops occupied a
Reich whose entire institutional structure had collapsed.19 Legisla-
tive, judicial, and executive authority was assumed by the Allied
commanders." Germany had suffered its worst political and social
defeat by ceasing to exist as a state and by becoming a geographic
region ruled by foreigners.
The victorious Allies, like the Germans, assumed that the dis-
ruptions of war could, as after previous conflicts, find resolution in a
peace treaty, but no immediate steps in that direction followed the
capitulation of Nazi Germany.2' All the victors agreed that Ger-
harsh settlement which seemed to place the blame for the World War I on Germany and its
allies and which ordered the payment of reparations to compensate the victors for the damages
caused by Germany's aggression. Unemployment and hyperinflation had cut deeply into the
German economy and by 1932, more than forty percent of the German work force was without
a job. Id.
13. Id. at 2. Hitler's goal was an empire of continental proportions in which the
Germans, by right of alleged racial superiority, would subjugate or eliminate lesser peoples.
14. F. NINKOVICH, GERMANY AND THE UNITED STATES: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE
GERMAN QUESTION SINCE 1945, at 14 (1988).
15. Id.
16. H. TURNER, supra note 12, at 3.
17. Id. at 4.
18. CONTEMPORARY GERMANY: POLITICS AND CULTURE 58 (C. Burdick, Jacobsen and
W. Kudszus eds. 1984). (hereinafter CONTEMPORARY GERMANY).
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. H. TURNER, supra note 12 at 8. In the spring of 1945 the Second World War
seemed far from over in the Pacific. The Japanese Empire still occupied much of China,
Southeast Asia and many islands of the Pacific. The United States, unaware that the detona-
tion of the first atomic bombs over two Japanese cities would put an end to the Pacific war by
August 1945, remained preoccupied by the prospect of a long and timely conflict. The British
and the Soviets were assessing the extensive damage to their respective nations and reasserting
Winter 1990]
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many should be subjected to denazification, demilitarization, democ-
ratization, decentralization, and decartelization.2 They further
agreed that the four-power Allied Control Council (Council) should
administer Germany as one economic entity.2 3 The Council, how-
ever, did not exercise full control over Germany since the Allies had
assigned executive authority in each of the four occupied zones to
the American, British, French, and Soviet commandants, who were
responsible primarily to their respective governments; disagreements
among the Four Powers during 1947 hampered the functioning of
the organs of the Four Power Administration.24
During this period, both the Western Powers as well as the So-
viet Union began to integrate into their respective spheres of influ-
ence those parts of Germany they occupied.25 An agreement on Jan-
uary 1, 1947 merged the British and American Zones of occupation
into an integrated economic area (bi-zone).28 In place of the envis-
aged joint control and neutralization of Germany, the occupied areas
gradually assimilated to the political, economic and ideological prin-
ciples of the occupying powers.27 Finally, the Soviet Union quit the
organs of the Four Power Administration at the German as well as
at the Berlin level. The Soviet delegation withdrew from the Council
on May 20, 1948, and thereafter ceased to meet with the Four
Power Administration. 28 The Western Powers, however, decided to
continue to work on the "German Question" on a tripartite basis.2 9
The currency reform carried out in the three Western zones in
1948 provided the Soviet Union with an excuse for blockading Berlin
in order to bring the former German capital totally into its domain.3"
For the eleven months, everything needed by the people of West Ber-
lin-food, coal, and all vital supplies for the city's inhabitants and
Western troops-was flown into Berlin by American, French, and
British airlifts.31 This became known as the "Berlin Airlift. '32 The
their influence over strategically vital areas. The French, crushed by their 1940 military de-
feat, struggled to revive their national institutions. Id.
22. Id. at 11.
23. Id. at 12. However, two economic spheres, one in the Western zone and one in the
Eastern zone, were recognized.
24. E. ZIVIER, THE LEGAL STATUS OF THE LAND BERLIN: A SURVEY AFTER THE QUAD-
RIPARTITE AGREEMENT 6 (1982) [hereinafter E. ZIVER]. The Foreign Minister Conferences in
Paris (April 25-May 15 and June 15-July 12, 1946), in Moscow (March 10-April 24, 1947)
and in London (Nov. 25-Dec. 15, 1947) brought no substantial progress on the German
Question.
25. CONTEMPORARY GERMANY, Id. at 62.
26. Id.
27. CONTEMPORARY GERMANY, supra note 18, at 63.
28. Archiv der Gegenwart, 1428 H (1948) as cited in E. ZIVIER, supra note 24, at 6.
29. Id. at 7. "Declaration by the Western Commandants on the Continued Operation of
the Allied Komandatura, Berlin, December 21, 1948." Documents on Berlin, No. 33, 58-58;
Dokumente zur Berlin-Frage, Nr. 49 at 67.
30. H. TURNER, supra note 12, at 24.
31. German Information Center, Berlin: Crisis and Challenge 14 (1965).
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Soviet Union eventually backed down and on May 4, 1949, an agree-
ment ending the blockade was arranged through the United Na-
tions."3 The division of Berlin into eastern and western zones took
place during the blockade period, at the end of 1948. 3" A few
months later, the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) was created
in the West by the acceptance of the FRG's Basic Law and by free
elections to the first German Parliament (Bundestrat).35 The Com-
munist leadership in the Eastern zone soon reciprocated by establish-
ing the Movement for a People's Congress, which had been created
to ensure general social and political conformity in the Soviet occu-
pation zone and eventually led to the formation of the German Dem-
ocratic Republic (GDR).3s Both German states immediately claimed
to be the sole "legal" German State to represent all Germany.3 7
Neither of the German States which came into existence at the
end of 1949 was a free agent in deciding t'he future of Germany. The
main powers concerned-the United States and the Soviet
Union-wanted a reunification of Germany on their own terms, if at
all.38 Events have, however, landed upon opposite ends of the contin-
uum for the two Germanies: East Germany, the GDR, prior to the
recent reforms, was a rigidly organized Communist state without
free elections, guaranteed human and civil rights in practice, or until
November 1989, the fundamental freedom for its citizens to leave
their own country. 9 Above all, it has historically been contained
within a satellite system under the tight control of Moscow. ° The
32 Id.
33. CONTEMPORARY GERMANY, supra note 18, at 64.
34. H. TURNER, supra note 12, at 25.
35. Id. at 27.
36. CONTEMPORARY GERMANY, supra note 18, at 64.
37. Berlin: Crisis and Challenge, supra note 31, at 16.
38. For United States policy towards the German Question as of December, 1957, see
e.g., U.S. National Security Document No. 5727, declassified in Washington in 1982, which
states:
. . . Germany is of vital importance to the U.S.: a) Germany's location in the
heart of Europe and its considerable material and human resources make it a
key area in the struggle between the Communist and free worlds; b) the division
of Germany is a chronic source of European instability and East-West friction
and a possible source of major armed conflict; c) West German military associa-
tion with Western Europe is very important to strengthen NATO capabilities in
Europe . . . major policy guidance . . . make clear that reunification is essential
to any genuine relaxation of tension between the USSR and the West but that
the US will not agree to any reunification involving: a) Communist domination
of a reunified Germany; b) a federated Germany which perpetuates the existing
government of the GDR; c) the withdrawal of US and other allied forces from
West Germany without an effective quid pro quo from the Soviets and the satel-
lites . . . .
Id.
39. International Pact on Civil and Political Rights, art. 12, United Nations, 1966.
40. POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, BASIC Docu-
MENTS 373 (C. Schweitzer, D. Kaisten, R. Spencer, R. Cole, D. Kommer, A. Nichols eds.
1984).
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FRG, on the other hand, has a written democratic constitution with
all due rights and liberties for the individual, including free elec-
tions.41 It is also part of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO).
III. The Power Structure in the Federal Republic of Germany
The Constitution of the FRG, known as the Basic Law, was
conceived as a provisional document which deliberately avoided cer-
tain subjects, such as basic social rights, because there was hope in
1948 that a constitution for all of Germany might be enacted in the
then foreseeable future.4 It was drafted by the representatives of the
three occupation powers-the United States, Britain, and France-
and those West German leaders acceptable to the powers, in the
name of the entire "German people."'43 According to article 146, the
Basic Law was to "cease to be in force on the day on which a consti-
tution adopted by a free decision of the German people comes into
force.""
The Constitution was designed to strengthen federalism.' 5 The
declared object of the framers of the Basic Law of 1949; as stated in
the preamble, was "to give a new order to political life for a transi-
tional period."' 6 The occupying powers, especially the United States,
intervened numerous times in the process of drafting the Constitu-
tion. 47 The role of the German president was kept deliberately weak
because the experiences of the Weimar Republic suggested that
competition between the president and the parliamentary majority
should not be allowed to occur again.48
In light of the experience of the Nazi dictatorship, the system
was constructed with an exaggerated attention to the supremacy of
law, and for the first time in German history, the constitution' be-
came the supreme law of the land.' 9 Basic rights were protected
without provision for exceptions and all acts of the State were sub-
41. Id.
42. CONTEMPORARY GERMANY, supra note 18, at 77. The separate existence of the two
German States during the Cold War and the inclusion of the separate parts of Germany in the
economic and military alliance systems destroyed these hopes. Id.
43. L. EDINGER, WEST GERMAN POLITIcs 7 (1986). "German people" also included
those Germans to whom participation was denied because they lived in the area controlled by
the Soviet Union. Id.
44. Id. at 9.
45. CONTEMPORARY GERMANY, supra note 18, at 77.
46. L. EDINGER, supra note 43, at 9.
47. As such, the document which was drawn up was not an expression of prevailing
political norms in Western Germany, but a compromise between the various views of the mem-
bers of the constituent assembly and of the American, French and British military governors
and their advisors. Id. at 9.
48. E. ZIVIER, supra note 24, at 57.
49. CONTEMPORARY GERMANY, supra note 18, at 107.
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ject to judicial review.5" The West German constitution emulated the
American model, but it went beyond it by creating a Federal Consti-
tutional Court as a specialized guardian of the constitution with the
task of resolving disputes between various governmental authorities
as well as protecting the basic rights of citizens.51 The Basic Law
grants the states two important roles: (1) states, rather than the fed-
eral government, have primary powers in important areas, most no-
tably education, cultural affairs, radio, television, law enforcement,
the environment, the organization of the bureaucracy, and the regu-
lation of local government; 51 and (2) West Germany has a field sys-
tem of administration with only a small number of bureaucrats in
Bonn.53
The most significant democratic institution established by the
Basic Law is the federal parliament or Bundestrat which'enjoys the
greatest measure of political power within the governmental sys-
tem.54 This institution is a hybrid between the United States Senate,
which accords each state an equal number of representatives, and
the Federal Council of Bismarck's empire, which allotted the num-
ber of representatives according to the size of each state.55 All laws
require approval by a majority of its deputies, who number just
under 500, with a requisite two-thirds majority vote for constitu-
tional amendments.5 The Bundestrat ordinarily considers only con-
troversial constitutional legislation; half of the bills passed have re-
quired two-thirds majority vote for constitutional amendments.
Other bills require only a majority vote to pass, with a second vote
requiring a two-thirds majority where there are any constitutional
challenges to the Basic Law. 57 Although the Constitutional Court in
1974 somewhat circumscribed its importance, the Bundestrat still
considers and comments on draft legislation submitted by the cabi-
net; it approves bills that have passed the Bundestrat; it exercises its
right of an absolute or suspensive veto; and in the case of a veto it
seeks to resolve its differences with Bundestrat representatives in a
conference committee that normally succeeds in redrafting contro-
50. Id. at 78.
51. P. KATZENSTEIN, POLICY AND POLITICS IN WEST GERMANY: THE GROWTH OF A
SEMISOVEREIGN STATE 17 (1987).
52. Id. at 16.
53. Id. The effect of these constitutional provisions is readily apparent. The federal gov-
ernment has no choice but to negotiate and cooperate with centers of State power over which it
has no control.
54. H. TURNER, supra note 12, at 40.
55. Id. at 16.
56. Id. at 40. The deputies are chosen in elections open to all citizens eighteen years of
age and older (until 1971 the minimum age was 21). Bundestrat elections must be held at
least every four years and may occur after less time has elapsed if sufficient backing cannot be
found for a cabinet.
57. L. EDINGER, supra note 43, at 14.
Winter 19901
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versial legislation.58 In short, as an expression of West German fed-
eralism, the Bundestrat is a powerful institution in a decentralized
state.5 9
IV. The Origins and Growth of the German Democratic Republic.
East German history is conventionally dated from either the Al-
lied conferences at Yalta (February 1945) and Potsdam (August
1945) when the boundaries of postwar occupation were set down, or
from the formal creation of the GDR on October 7, 1949.0 After its
creation the Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands (Socialist
Unity Party of Germany)(SED) defines the period from 1949 to
1961 as a stage in the "Socialist revolution" in which the "founda-
tions of Socialism" were created.8' These terms are used to describe
a comprehensive structural change that was intended to radically al-
ter the political system, the economy, and society.12 A distinct Ger-
man path to socialism was soon replaced and the goal soon became
emulation of the USSR and the construction of a "people democ-
racy" similar to those of the other regimes set up with Soviet back-
ing in Eastern Europe."
Repressive methods of rule were applied throughout the Soviet
zone by the SED-dominated civil administration as those holding, or
aspiring to positions in the bureaucracy, judiciary or the school sys-
tem had to pass ideological scrutiny. 4 Dissent or disagreement with
the policies of the occupation regime was discouraged by denying the
offenders advancement in their careers, dismissing them from their
jobs, or imprisoning them.65 In their policy on Germany the GDR
and the Soviet Union pursued a double strategy through which they
hoped to influence Western positions. As a result of its own policy of
non-recognition, the government of the FRG rejected all official con-
tacts with East Germany. The FRG's adoption of this policy under
Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, which was intended to weaken the
58. P. KATZENSTEIN, supra note 51, at 17.
59. Id.
60. C. SCHARF, POLITICS AND CHANGE IN EAST GERMANY: AN EVALUATION OF SOCIAL-
IST DEMOCRACY 2 (1984). For their part, East German historians emphasize departures from
a past of feudal and capitalist repression and from the tyranny of national socialism. Western
historians, employing similar conventions, depict the present GDR as essentially having no
past and, often by implication, as being unnatural or illegitimate. Id.
61. CONTEMPORARY GERMANY, supra note 18, at 204.
62. Id.
63. H. TURNER, supra note 12, at 46. In schools and universities throughout the Soviet
zone, Marxist-Leninist indoctrination became a compulsory part of the curriculum. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 47.
66. CONTEMPORARY GERMANY, supra note 18, at 209. The Federal Republic of Ger-
many (FRG) conside*red the GDR to be nothing more than an executive organ of Soviet inter-
ests and thus felt that it would be possible to overcome the division of Germany only by inte-
grating the eastern part of Germany into the West German "core state." Id.
[Vol. 8:2
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GDR by its systematic isolation, motivated the GDR's political lead-
ership to erode this attitude by constantly proposing negotiations.6"
The GDR government under Otto Grotewohl repeatedly emphasized
the need for accelerating the conclusion of a peace treaty and the
restoration of German unity through agreements between the two
German States.68 As a result, the Soviet Union developed a German
policy initiative of its own aimed primarily at preventing the in-
tended integration of the GDR into Western Europe on the basis of
security considerations.6 9
After the failure of the Berlin Conference of Foreign Ministers
early in 1954, each side's policy on Germany was increasingly re-
duced to an effort to justify its own position in the light of irreconcil-
able views.7" Western demands for all-German free elections without
preconditions, while refusing to recognize the GDR as a separate
state, were countered with East German proposals for an a priori
conclusion of a peace treaty, recognition of the GDR as a negotiat-
ing partner, and neutralization of Germany." The belief that politi-
cal unification was hopeless abounded and was reinforced by the Ko-
rean War and the advancement to membership of both the FRG and
the GDR in NATO and the Warsaw Pact respectively. When the
FRG became a member of NATO in May 1955, the Soviet Union,
for its part, stabilized the GDR's political status by means of the
Declaration of Sovereignty of March 25, 1954, and the treaty of
September 20, 1955, which formally ended occupation status.7 The
Soviets created the Warsaw Pact on May 14, 1955, and with the
participation of the GDR, the formation of military blocs in Europe
was established, permanently consolidating the political division of
Germany in 1955. TM
A. The Construction of the Berlin Wall
Faced with increasing economic disorders in the GDR, the polit-
ical leadership attempted to increase economic production by means
of an administrative measure which imposed higher work quotas
67. Id. at 210.
68. M. DENNIS, supra note 10, at 13.
69. Id. at 15.
70. CONTEMPORARY GERMANY, supra note 18, at 209.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 210. The line dividing Germany at the same time became the line dividing
Europe between the opposing systems of East and West.
73. E. ZIVIER, supra note 24, at 74.
74. CONTEMPORARY GERMANY, supra note 18, at 210. Despite the Western policy of
non-recognition, the maintenance of "provisional status" had become an illusion, as the Soviet
Union had drawn the GDR into its sphere of power and, as such, guaranteed the existence of
its political system. In support of this status, the following statement was made at the Third
SED Party Conference in March 1956: "The development of the GDR can no longer be sepa-
rated from the development of the entire Socialist camp."
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which in turn triggered the uprising of June 17, 1953. 7' The citizens
of the GDR had no choice between political alternatives in their own
society, but they were able to choose between two German societies
by "voting with their feet" and moving to the West.7' The GDR
attempted to implement its "priority economic task" in 1958 with
the objective of attaining and surpassing West German economic
growth by 1961. 7 The communist party's ambitious economic aims
were rapidly seen to be unattainable as workers fled to the West.
When the total who had fled reached nearly three million, or one out
of every six persons in the part of Germany occupied by the USSR
in 1945, the GDR obtained the approval of the Soviet Union and the
other Warsaw Pact countries and began to seal off its border with
the West; it began construction of the Berlin Wall on August 31,
1961 .71 The abrupt end of the refugee movement became the basis
for economic stability and an acceleration of economic growth, turn-
ing the GDR into an achievement-oriented society."
The effects of the Berlin Wall soon became evident in the eco-
nomic sphere. For the first time, the East German regime could
make allocations for the economy without having to deal with the
constant yet unpredictable loss of skilled laborers.80, At the sixth
SED Congress in January 1963, GDR leader Walter Ulbricht un-
veiled a new economic system as an integral part of the comprehen-
sive construction of Socialism.81 Even though the GDR still lagged
behind the FRG in the production of consumer goods, it began to
appease the desire of its citizens for material conveniences.8 2 By the
latter half of the 1960's, Ulbricht dominated the GDR, but during
1970 his economic reforms began to abate. The economy exper-
ienced a number of setbacks, and the aging leader's inability to sum-
mon sufficient energy to rectify these problems was instrumental in
75. Id. at 211. This demonstrative denial of loyalty on the part of the workers in opposi-
tion to the arrogance of the "workers and farmer's state" clearly showed that the rule of the
SED could be guaranteed only through the use of Soviet occupation forces.
76. German Information Center, supra note 31, at 27.
77. CONTEMPORARY GERMANY, supra note 18, at 212.
78. H. TURNER, supra note 12, at 130. Under the guns of the People's Police, workmen
blocked with barbed wire entanglements the many street crossings between the two parts of
the City. GDR guards permitted passage at only a handful of locations and turned back any-
one from the East who lacked the regime's permission to cross over to the west. The fortifica-
tions soon grew into the Berlin Wall, more than a hundred miles in length which sealed off
access from the East and severed communications as well.
79. CONTEMPORARY GERMANY, supra note 18, at 212.
80. H. TURNER, supra note 12, at 138,
81. M. DENNIS, supra note 10, at 33.
82. H. TURNER, supra note 12, at 139. Whereas in the 1950's private automobiles had
been virtually unknownin the GDR, by 1969, when forty-seven percent of the households in
the FRG owned a car, but only fourteen percent in the GDR had acquired a vehicle. Id. Two-
thirds of East German households, as compared to nearly three-quarters in the West, had
acquired television sets by that time. Id.
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his replacement by Erich Honecker in May 1971.8
V. The Federal Constitutional Court and the Basic Treaty of 1972
Between the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Demo-
cratic Republic
The decision of the Federal Constitutional Court of the FRG of
July 13, 1973 dealing with the Basic Treaty dispute marked the end
of a political struggle that caused polarization of political opinion in
Germany. On the one hand, there were those who felt that after the
irretrievable losses suffered as a result of the Second World War,
Germany as a whole should not be further diminished by a perpetua-
tion of the partition of Germany into two independent States, and
even less by giving such partition legal recognition.84 On the other
hand, there were leaders who felt that whatever the effect on a long-
range solution of the German problem might be, it was in the best
interests of Germany to attain an accommodation between East and
West on the best available terms, even at the price of political ortho-
doxy. 85 The Constitutional Court, faced with the dilemma of either
instigating a diplomatic crisis between the FRG and the GDR or of
the alienation of a substantial segment of German political public
opinion, successfully disposed of this issue in a manner that may well
have permitted both sides to claim victory.8"
A. The Judiciary of the Federal Republic of Germany
The Constitutional Court itself may be regarded as one of the
seminal achievements of German constitutional development. The
Constitutional Court is the most political and institutionally autono-
mous component of West Germany's decentralized judicial struc-
ture.87 Constitutional adjudication had been established in the FRG
in its purest form through the Constitutional Court, which is
modeled after the United States Supreme Court but which deals ex-
clusively with constitutional issues.88 The Constitutional Court is the
organ which is exclusively called upon to make binding decisions on
all questions concerning application and interpretation of the Basic
Law89 (the constitution of the FRG). The sixteen judges of its two
83. M. DENNIS, supra note 10, at 35.
84. EAST EUROPE MONOGRAPHS, GERMAN UNITY: DOCUMENTATION AND COMMENTA-
RIES ON THE BASIC TREATY 7 (F. Hess ed. 1974). (hereinafter EAST EUROPE MONOGRAPHS).
85. Id.
86. See R. WILDHABER, TREATY-MAKING POWER AND CONSTITUTION (1971).
87. P. BLAIR, FEDERALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW IN WEST GERMANY 112 (1981).
88. L. EDINGER, supra note 43, at 30.
89. EAST EUROPE MONOGRAPHS, supra note 84, at 11; Article 92 of the Basic Law of
the Federal Republic of Germany lists specifically the Federal Constitutional Court. It is,
therefore, a constitutional organ of the Federation. This special position of the Federal Consti-
tutional Court is also emphasized in paragraph I of the Act of March 12, 1951 which regu-
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chambers are bound only by the Basic Law and may, on appeal, set
aside the verdict of any other court-including the constitutional
courts of the states-if they find the verdict to conflict with the spirit
or letter of the Basic Law.9" The central basis of its jurisdiction is
conflict among governmental agencies, disagreements resulting from
the federal structure, and determinations of constitutionality and
constitutional constraints.9 ' The Court has original jurisdiction in the
constitutional disputes between the Federal Government and state
governments, between the Federal executive and parliament, be-
tween different states, and between other courts.92
The Supreme Court of the United States, by way of contrast,
does not engage in a formal review of constitutionality in the way
used in the German system. It cannot decide abstract problems of
constitutional law nor abstract determination of constitutionality
which is so significant in German constitutional adjudication.93 Al-
though the importance of the United States Supreme Court is
grounded in its position as a constitutional organ, it is most visible in
its role as the court of last resort. 94 Contrary to the practice of the
FRG's Constitutional Court, the United States Supreme Court can-
not, in the abstract, declare laws invalid because of their conflict
with the Constitution; it can only invalidate such laws in connection
with the case at bar.95
The regular courts of the FRG function at four levels, with the
district courts (Amstergerichte) at the lowest level. 96 They operate in
towns or other limited geographical areas and exercise jurisdiction
over minor civil suits and petty criminal offenses punishable by up to
two years imprisonment.9 7 The next level is the county court system
(Landgerichte) which is composed of trial courts of general jurisdic-
lates in detail the Court's position and jurisdiction. Id. It describes the Court as "autonomous
and independent from all other constitutional organs." Grundgeselz (Basic Law) art. 92 (W.
Ger.).
90. CONTEMPORARY GERMANY, supra note 18, at 209.
91. EAST EUROPE MONOGRAPHS, supra note 84.
92. E. ZIVIER, supra note 24, at 80. It may also consider-and reject-complaints by
individuals and organizations who claim that their constitutional rights have been invaded by
the public authorities and that they have no other recourse for redress. Id. It may also outlaw
organizations and practices deemed to be inconsistent with the constitutional order and the
duties of responsible citizenship. Id.
93. The power of judicial review of the United States Supreme Court does not follow, as
in the case of the Federal Constitutional Court, from a provision of the Constitution. Chief
Justice Marshall was able to bring about the acceptance of judicial review in Marbury v.
Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803). Compare HAINES, THE AMERICAN DOCTRINE OF
JUDICIAL SUPREMACY 94 (1932).
94. EAST EUROPE MONOGRAPHS, supra note 84.
95. Id.
96. POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT IN THE FRG, supra note 40, at 85.
97. Id. The district courts also perform many non- judicial functions such as administer-
ing estates, drafting wills and conveyances, keeping registers, appointing guardians, and super-
vising executors and trustees in bankruptcy. Id.
[Vol. 8:2
GERMAN QUESTION OF REUNIFICATION
tion.98 The court of last resort in each state is the superior court
(Oberlandesgericht), although it also has original jurisdiction in
cases involving high treason and betrayal of the Basic Law."
The final court of appeals is the Federal Supreme Court
(Bundesgerichtshof).100
B. The Decision of the Constitutional Court Regarding the Basic
Treaty of 1972
It was hoped that the conclusion of a peace treaty between the
two Germanies would make possible the re-establishment of normal
relations between the GDR and the FRG. On November 8, 1972,
the Intra-German Treaty negotiated between the FRG and the GDR
was signed. 101 Article 4 of the Intra-German Treaty on the Basis of
Relations provides that neither of the signatories can represent the
other internationally or act in its name, a matter which caused
double diplomatic representations of the German States in foreign
countries and in international organizations such as the United Na-
tions.102 Key elements of the Intra-German Treaty on the basis of
relations are as follows: a mutual renunciation of force; inviolability
of the present frontier and territorial respect; a pledge to develop
good neighborly relations; an agreement to disagree on the nature of
the national question; a respect for the autonomy of each state; the
principle that the jurisdiction of each is confined to its own borders;
and an explicit agreement to develop and promote cooperation in a
number of fields including economics, science, and sports.1 °
On May 28, 1973, the State Government of Bavaria petitioned
the Federal Constitutional Court for a declaration that "[t]he Act
concerning the Treaty of December 21, 1972 between the FRG and
the GDR is inconsistent with the Basic Law and is therefore null
and void."' 4 To substantiate the petition, the State Government of
Bavaria argued that the Treaty conflicted with the command to pre-
serve the national unity of Germany because it is based on a theory,
rejected by the Basic Law, of the extinction of the German State
and the coming into existence of two independent states on the terri-
tory of the Old Reich."° Bavaria also argued that the Treaty con-




101. EAST EUROPE MONOGRAPHS, supra note 84, at 35.
102. Intra-German Treaty between the FRG and the GDR, art. 4, Dec. 21, 1972; Kin-
dermann, supra note 8, at 114.
103. Kindermann, supra note 8, at 115.
104. EAST EUROPE MONOGRAPHS, supra note 84, at 38.
105. Id.
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Law because it recognized the GDR as an independent and sover-
eign state, on an equal standing with the Federal Republic.106 Bava-
ria further argued that the Treaty was in conflict with the constitu-
tional obligation to protect and care for Germans living in the GDR
who are considered Germans under article 116 of the Basic Law.1"7
The Treaty, however, precludes the FRG from legal intervention on
behalf of the Germans who reside in the territory of the GDR; as a
consequence, additional difficulties arise when representatives of the
FRG in third countries want to assist Germans in the GDR.108
The Federal Constitutional Court dismissed Bavaria's petition
as being prejudicial to its own political interpretation of the Treaty
as well as disregarding the political situation which led to the
Treaty. 109 The Court weighed the option of not having the Treaty in
force and concluded that the advantages of the Treaty were evi-
dent.110 The Treaty served the practical constitutional aim of secur-
ing peace and humaneness by bringing to the people practical bene-
fits; it was in consonance with the intent of the framers of the Basic
Law to uphold the existence of Germany and to be a document of a
policy not governed by the interests of the Federal Republic, but by
the needs of the whole Nation. It left the German question open."
The Court held that reunification was indeed a constitutional
command of the Basic Law, but that the decision as to the politically
appropriate and expedient manner for attaining reunification, how-
ever, had to be left to the organs of the Federal Republic responsible
for such political action. " The Court also stated that the constitu-
tional entities entrusted under the Basic Law with the duty of pro-
tecting the free, democratic fundamental order and its institutions
had to decide whether a specific and otherwise constitutional mea-
sure would legally hinder or factually render reunification impossible
and whether such action should not be taken. "' The Court con-
cluded that they may only block a legislative mandate if it is an
unequivocal abuse of discretion or if its measure for legal or factual
reasons obviously contradict the goal of reunification."'
106. Id. Bavaria argued that in the place of the German Reich two sovereign states
guaranteeing each other their existence have emerged thus leading to a permanent division of
Germany. The Treaty turns the previous demarcation line into a voluntary and contractually
accept able State border. Id.
107. Id. at 41; Grungesetz (Basic Law) art. 116 (W. Ger.).
108. EAST EUROPE MONOGRAPHS, supra note 84, at 39.
109. Id. at 41.
110. Id. Decisions of the Federal Constitutional Court 2 BvF 1/73 (1973).
Ill. EAST EUROPE MONOGRAPHS, supra note 84, at 41.
112. Id. at 45. Decisions of the Federal Constitutional Court 5, 85, 26 if; 12, 45, 51 ff.
113. Id. at 46. The Constitutional Court further stated that ample room for political
discretion in this field is granted above all to the legislative organs. Id. The weighing of the
prospects of its mandated policy aim of reunification is left to its discretion and that of the
parliamentary majority which is its power base. Id.
114. Id.
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By its decision, the Federal Constitutional Court not only ele-
vated the principle of reunification from the scarcely legally binding
field of obiter dictum, but confirmed its full legal contents. 15 The
wide field of discretion granted by sentence 3 of the preamble is lim-
ited by the leading principle 5 of the decision:
[n]o constitutional organ of the FRG may abandon the political
aim of the restoration of national unity; all constitutional organs
are obliged to strive for this aim through their policies . . this
includes the demand to keep awake the claim for reunification
internally and to advocate steadily this claim externally . . and
to avoid everything which might obstruct reunification. 11 6
For the first time, an internal connection between sentence 1 of the
preamble (fixation of national unity) and sentence 3 (the so-called
principle of reunification) was pronounced." 7
VI. The Opposition to the German Democratic Republic Under
Honecker (1971-1989)
Since Honecker succeeded Ulbricht as party leader in 1971, the
GDR has been subjected to social, economic, and political strains,
many of which originated outside its borders but which were aggra-
vated by the internal problems of East German society."18 Although
the GDR has managed to become one of the twelfth largest indus-
trial states in the world and has reached the highest living standard
of any of the Communist-ruled states, there has been a continuing
increase in dissatisfaction among its citizens."' This concern is pri-
marily connected with the fact that hopes of bettering material stan-
dards, awakened by Honecker, have not been fulfilled. 20 In addition,
the living standards of the East Germans is still only about half as
high as in West Germany.1 2' The record of opposition in Eastern
bloc countries reveals a clear link between economic problems and
political instability."2 The link took on particular significance under
Honecker as the GDR has experienced a shift of emphasis on the
leading role of the party from an ideological to an economic justifica-
115. Blumenwitz, The Limitations of Change Through Convergence 62 (1974), cited in
EAST EUROPE MONOGRAPHS, supra note 84.
116. Decisions of the Federal Constitutional Court, supra note 112.
117. Limitations of Change, supra note 115, at 62.
118. R. WOODS, OPPOSITION IN THE GDR UNDER HONECKER 8 (1986). The earliest of
these strains in the Honecker era arose from increased contact with the West. Against the
background of growing hostility between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China,
and rapprochement between the United States and China, the Soviet Union pushed the GDR
into detente with the West. Id.
119. H. WEBER. THE SOCIALIST UNITY PARTY 4 (1983); see also HONECKER'S GER-
MANY (D. Childs ed. 1985).
120. H. WEBER, supra note 119, at 5.
121. Id.
122. R. WOODS, supra note 118, at 15.
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tion, followed by mounting problems for the economy."'
Given the vagueness of legal criteria, the fact that the party
may not always move against political opposition, and the possibility
of the official line becoming flexible when challenged, opposition can
perhaps best be thought of as an unwelcome pressure for significant
political change.124 The major source of opposition in the GDR
under Honecker came from dissident intellectuals who wished to stay
in the GDR and who claimed the right to criticize the regime, to
recall it to its duty, and to advocate alternative policies for it to pur-
sue. 1 25 In the 1970's, the focus tended to be on issues of intellectual
freedom and on the shortcomings of East German Socialism. 126 In
the 1980's, criticism from intellectuals has tended to be directed to-
wards what is seen as the increasing militarization of GDR
society. 127
The second source of opposition in East Germany under Ho-
necker's rule, and the one which is most significant in light of the
recent mass exodus to West Germany, is the desire of East German
citizens who wish to leave the GDR and take up permanent resi-
dence in the West.12 8 Estimates of the numbers involved range from
150,000 to a staggering half a million out of a total population of
around seventeen million.1 2 The motives of those wishing to re-
nounce East German citizenship include hopes of a better economic
future; rejection of the East German political system, often from a
Christian or non-Socialist viewpoint; and the desire to be reunited
with family members residing in the West.13 ° Initially, the majority
of those wishing to leave were not allowed to do so and some resorted
to oppositional methods such as publicizing their cause in the West,
criticizing the GDR's record on basic human rights, forming them-
selves into self-help groups, and attempting to cross the border ille-
123. Id. The shift of emphasis has prompted observers to apply sociologist Antonin
Tiehm's concept of a "new social contract" Id. to the GDR. This is an unwritten agreement
according to which a political party guarantees the people a secure existence and a rising
standard of living and in return expects the people to accept certain limitations on their politi-
cal freedom and to acknowledge, or at least passively accept, the supremacy of the party. Id.
124. Id.
125. L. SCHAPIRO, POLITICAL OPPOSITION IN ONE-PARTY STATES 3 (1972).
126. R. WOODS, supra note 118, at 24. Following Wolf Biermann's expatriation in No-
vember 1976 for "gross dereliction of his duties" as a citizen of the GDR, over one hundred
well-known writers and artists made their way to the West, some after periods of imprison-
ment. Id.
127. Id. The high points of critical activity were the two Berlin meetings (December
1981 in East Berlin and April 1983 in West Berlin) of writers and scientists from the East and
West to discuss how to further the cause of peace. Both meetings were given extensive cover-
age on West German television, and many prominent East Germans aired their criticisms of
GDR peace policy. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 21.
130. R. WOODS, supra note 118, at 21.
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gaily. 131 As a result, many were charged with taking up illegal con-
tacts, agitation against the State, and illegal exodus.13 2
The GDR citizens who wish to go to the West come from all
segments of society and from all age groups. According to statistical
information compiled on the West German side relating to the
31,194 East Germans who emigrated to the Federal Republic in the
first half of 1984, there are indications that the emigrants' motives
may not have been exclusively political or related to family members
living in the West. 13 3 The largest single group (8,178) was comprised
of 25-34 year olds and the second largest (5,911) of 35-44 year
olds.13 4 Seventy percent of those who left were of employable age,
and given the fact that up to one million skilled workers in the GDR
are currently not able to obtain employment which matches their
relatively high level of qualifications, along with notoriously low pay
levels, it can be suggested that many of those who left did so because
they thought their economic prospects would be better in the
FRG. 13 5
VII. The 1989 Mass Exodus from East Germany
East Germans began fleeing to the West through Hungary in
June 1989 after Hungarian border guards began dismantling the
barbed wire "iron curtain" that separated Hungary from Austria for
decades. 13  Hungary's action marks the first time that a Warsaw
Pact country has aided an exodus of refugees from an allied Com-
munist nation. 3 7 East German leaders expressed outrage at the
Hungarian government and in Moscow, the Soviet news agency Tass
condemned Western media for what it called a "tendentious cam-
paign"' 1 8 to spur illegal East German emigration. 139 The exodus
131. Id. at 30.
132. In practice, many of those convicted do not serve the full sentence, but are "bought
free" by the FRG under the controversial Friekauf arrangements and thus eventually make
their way across the border. Id. at 32.
133. Id. at 33; Statistics for the Bundesausgleichsamt (',-Vt 6838/6943/1). See also R.
FRICKE, OPPOSITION IN THE GDR 162-174 (1978). Sociologists Kohler and Ronge discuss the
problems of interpreting their survey result that 71 percent of the emigrants cited "lack of
freedom of opinion" and 66 percent "political pressure" among their motives for leaving. Id.
134. R. FRICKE, supra note 133, at 1281. Seventy percent of those who left were of
employable age, a figure which is appreciably higher than for the East German population as a
whole (64% in 1982). R. WOODS, supra note 118, at 33.
135. R. WOODS, supra note 118, at 33. The survey further revealed that nearly seventy
percent of those asked expected working conditions to be better in the FRG than in the GDR.
(p. 1284).
136. Philadelphia Inquirer, Sep. 3, 1989, at 1, col. 6. At this time a reported 6,000 East
Germans already had sneaked through woods and cornfields to Austria evading Hungarian
border patrols that had been ordered to try to halt those trying to flee illegally, but not to shoot
them. Id.
137. N. Y. Times, Sep. 12, 1989, at 1, col. 6.
138. Id. at 6, col. 2.
139. Id.
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came after weeks of talks between the two Germanies failed and the
Hungarian government formally announced that it would allow all
East Germans in Hungary to leave for West Germany.14 ° West Ger-
man Chancellor, Helmut Kohl, in a speech delivered in Bremen,
stated that until East Germany adopted reforms, West Germany
would be seen as a mecca for unhappy East German citizens. 4'
Almost thirty years since the construction of the Berlin Wall in
August 1961, reunification of the two Germanies is once again forc-
ing itself into the political spotlight. Once more, the yearning of East
Germans is the driving force, and political freedom is a stronger
magnet than it was in 1961 when poverty was a factor. 42 The dra-
matic stampede of more than 50,000 East Germans into West Ger-
many marked the largest mass exodus from behind the Iron Curtain
since the Berlin Wall was constructed.143 To open its borders, Hun-
gary suspended key paragraphs of a 1969 bilateral treaty with East
Germany that forbid unauthorized passage of citizens of either coun-
try into third countries.
In the weeks that followed the initial exodus, riot police bat-
tered protesters during massive demonstrations in East Berlin, Leip-
zig, Dresden, and Potsdam.' 5 The riots were fueled by the recent
exodus and the presence of Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev at the
celebration of East Germany's 40th Anniversary on October 7,
1989.140 During his two-day visit, Gorbachev publicly called on Ho-
necker to follow the Soviet example of reform. 47 But Honecker, a
doctrinaire Communist, continued to refuse, repeating that his gov-
ernment would adhere to what he called the "proven course for the
good of the people.' 4 8
As East Germany's Communists struggled to ease a volatile sit-
uation, their brethren in Hungary took steps to further denounce
Communism in Eastern Europe. Over the weekend of October 8,
1989, a majority of the 1,274 delegates at a Hungarian Communist
Party Congress voted to rechristen themselves the Republic of Hun-
gary and sever their Communist ideals for all intents and pur-
poses. 1 9 The Hungarians will draft a new constitution based in part
on the United States model, featuring a separation of executive, leg-
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, Oct. 16, 1989, at 40, col. 1.
143. Id. at 39.
144. TIME, Sep. 25, 1989, at 30. Budapest's bold maneuver provided the West with a
vivid glimpse of fractures within the Warsaw Pact and raised unnerving questions about the
refugee tide that might ensue if the Iron Curtain were completely dismantled.




149. TIME, Oct. 23, 1989, at 44.
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islative, and judicial power and establishment of a Western-style so-
cial democracy, which presumably will mix democracy and free en-
terprise with a major government stake in the economy and a large
welfare-state safety net.15 The Hungarian decision, coming less than
two months after the installation of Poland's first non-Communist
government since the end of World War II, reinforced the historic
shift taking place in Europe. 5'
Confronted with these increasing demands for change, the East
German Communist Party on October 18, 1989, ousted Honecker,
its hard-line leader of eighteen years, and named his fifty-two year-
old prot6g6 as his successor. 152 The new leader, Egon Krenz, had
been the former Politburo member charged with security and youth
affairs.153  He was named to Honecker's three former posi-
tions-party chief, head of state, and chairman of the Defense
Council-granting him the broad powers which Honecker had taken
years to accumulate.' 5' Krenz was indelibly marked as Honecker's
creation, rising through the party ranks from a very young age.' 5
With growing anti-government demonstrations, Krenz's regime
promised dialogue and reform: during the week of October 23, 1989,
it moved toward easing travel restrictions, relaxing censorship, and
expanding the supply of consumer goods.'
VIII. The Future of the German Democratic Republic
The demands for reform continue to gain momentum in East
Germany. On October 26, 1989, in Leipzig, more than 100,000
protesters staged the largest single demonstration in the country's
history shouting "Freedom and Democracy now."' 57 There are signs
of ferment inside the ruling party and some top party members have
criticized the country's "climate of intellectual and social stagna-
tion." 58 The pro-reform group, New Forum, and the fledgling Social
Democratic Party are emboldened by growing popular support. Any
attempt by East Germany to further suppress these movements will
only result in further unrest and rejection of the present regime.
150. NEWSWEEK, Oct. 23, 1989, at 36.
151. TIME, supra note 150, at 44'
152. N. Y. Times, Oct. 19, 1989, at 1, col. 1.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. TIME, Oct. 30, 1989 at 61. Krenz is the son of a tailor who joined the Young
Pioneers in his early youth and became a full-fledged Communist Party member by age 18. He
spent three years at the party academy in Moscow, then returned home to rise quickly through
the party ranks. He has been a member of the Party's Central Committee since 1973. A
decade later, he joined the Politburo, gradually assuming responsibility for both youth affairs
and the country's security apparatus. Id.
156. NEWSWEEK, Oct. 30, 1989, at 52.
157. Id. at 53.
158. Id.
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Nearly 60,000 of East Germany's brightest and best-trained cit-
izens have fled the country since August 1989. If East Germany is to
maintain any type of stability, it must restore confidence in the rul-
ing party. Political reforms are needed in East Germany since the
price of repression will only exacerbate the social stagnation of the
country. The time has come for a more progressive and visionary
thinker to take the reins of East Germany and lead it down the path
of democracy. If East Germany continues to reject the sweeping re-
forms taking place in the Soviet Union, Poland, Romania, Czecho-
slovakia, and Hungary, not only will East Germany further isolate
itself from its East bloc allies, but it will deteriorate as the citizens
continue to emigrate to the West.
The mass refugee exodus has once again brought the issue of
German unification into the spotlight. The simple answer is that a
Germany restored might prove to be a positive event, but in the long
run it might not be the practical solution. A quasi-democratic nation
of seventy-eight million with an army of 650,000 in the heart of Eu-
rope could rise into a new power very quickly, but also a new enemy
if the alliances erode and the new order in the USSR collapses. The
influence of the current tides of change are not small, but they could
be rolled back.
After conferring with Mikhail Gorbachev on November 1, 1989,
Egon Krenz returned home and pleaded with his citizens to stop flee-
ing the country, promising a number of reforms through a far-reach-
ing program to change the Constitution, the economy, the education
system, and the administration. 159 On November 6, 1989, East Ger-
many published a draft of a law that declared for the first time that
every citizen has the right to travel abroad or to emigrate. 160 Sebas-
tian Pflugbeil, a founding member of the opposition movement New
Forum stated that "travel is no longer the primary problem as too
many have already left."'' "The leadership must take other steps to
prove that it is earnest in its reform effort."' 6
Under the awesome pressure of mass demonstrations and mass
flight, the entire forty-four member Council of Ministers of the East
German Cabinet resigned on November 7, 1989 and requested that
Parliament select a new government.' 3 The demonstrations have
continued with demands that the people of East Germany be allowed
159. N. Y. Times, November 4, 1989, at 1, col. 6.
160. N. Y. Times, November 7, 1989, at 4, col. 1.
161. Id.
162. Id. An evening news program in East Germany reported that 23,500 East Germans
had left for West Germany since November 4, 1989 when East Germany first announced that
its citizens would be allowed to leave through Czechoslovakia using only personal identification
cards. Nearly 170,000 East Germans, about 1 percent of the country's population, have left in
1989.
163. N. Y. Times, November 8, 1989, at 1, col. 1.
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to decide their own future in freedom and self-determination through
a system of free elections. On November 9, 1989, the reform move-
ment caused what will be remembered as a great event in history as
the East German government opened up the Berlin Wall which had
separated the two Germanies for twenty-eight years.'" By this sim-
ple act of forcing their rulers to open the Berlin Wall and allow
them to go wherever they wish, the people of East Germany have
irrevocably changed the way Berlin, Germany, and all of Europe
have defined themselves for more than forty years; 6 5 the entire post-
war European order had been based on the assumption that Ger-
many and Europe would remain divided and that the countries of
Eastern and Western Europe would be firmly anchored in their re-
spective alliances. 6 '
IX. Conclusion
In the wake of these momentous reforms, the German question
of reunification has once again been thrust to the forefront, but a
single Germany still remains a distant prospect. The first signs of
new policies in Bonn indicated a consensus that the East Germans
should be left alone to decide the future of their state.6 7 Under the
West German Constitution, the goal of unity is to be achieved
through self-determination, and if the East Germans decide to form
a socialist or non-socialist state, the West Germans will have to re-
spect that choice. 68 The Communist Party in East Germany as of
November 1989 denied any possibility of reunification, and New Fo-
rum and other opposition movements have also declared themselves
opposed to union.'69 The opposition, composed largely of reformist
socialists, insists that its goal is to create a new form of democratic
socialism in East Germany. 70
East Germany's Communist Party granted the ultimate conces-
sion when its leader, Egon Krenz, and the other nine members of the
Politburo resigned during the week of December 11, 1989, along
with the entire 163-member Central Committee.' 7 ' Honecker, mean-
while was expelled from the party, placed under house arrest and
164. N. Y. Times, November 10, 1989, at 1, col. 3. At Checkpoint Charlie where Allied
and Soviet tanks were locked in a tense face-off while the Berlin Wall was being erected in
August, 1961, lines of cars and people began to file across the border by late evening. Id.
165. N. Y. Times, November I1, 1989, at 1, col. 3.
166. Id. In this assumption, the United States, in the NATO alliance, guaranteed the
security of Western Europe. And in this same assumption, France, West Germany and the
other major industrial countries of Western Europe began the economic and political nification
of the European Community.
167. N. Y. Times, November 16, 1989, at 20, col. 3.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 20, col. 5.
170. Id.
171. TIME, December 18, 1989, at 14.
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criminally charged with an additional 104 party functionaries and
eight former Politburo members.172 On December 14, 1989 the
Communist Party and the opposition yielded agreements to recom-
mend parliamentary elections for May 6, 1990 and to rewrite the
Constitution. 173 The party overwhelmingly nominated Gregor Gysi, a
reformist lawyer, as party leader who at forty-one becomes the
youngest Communist leader in Eastern Europe.1 74
The changes that have occurred and continue to occur in East
Germany have set into motion political and economic forces that
cannot be reversed. The prospects of a unified Germany are probably
in the future, but the reforms must continue in an effort to equalize
economic conditions and freedoms on both sides of the border. Oth-
erwise, it is apparent that East Germans will continue to move to the
West. The political structures are still too divergent to allow a com-
promise of goals and ideals. The two governments need to strive for
a de facto unification of Germany which would maintain separate
political structures while embracing an attitude of close cooperation
between the two German states. Gregor Gysi must listen to the de-
mands of his people, the Communist Party, and other nations who
are realizing the true right of the people to decide their own national
fate. East Germany and Czechoslovakia have joined Hungary and
Poland in abolishing the Communist Party's constitutional monopoly
on power. 175 Communism has demonstrated that it does not work
and if East Germany is going to survive as an independent country
with the support of its citizens, fundamental reforms pursuant to a
democratic ideology are the only solution.
John A. Zohlman III
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 15.
175. Id.
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